


STATINTL



SAN JUAN, P.R.

STAR

SEP 14 1974

M - 37,427

S - 38,706

PDP Official Denies Charge That CIA Funded Party Rally

✓ Jose A. Alcaide, executive secretary of the Popular Democratic Party, has denied charges made by Juan Mari

Bras, secretary general of the Pro Independence Movement, that the PDP has received financial aid from the Central Intelligence Agency.

Alcaide said that a little over a year ago Civil Defense Director Ramon F. Calderon accused the PDP of receiving money and instructions from Moscow, now the head of the MPI accuses it of receiving aid from Washington.

He said both these accusations are false and although they contradict each other, they tend to use public opinion to defame and inflict harm on those dedicated to help Puerto Rico.

All that is missing now, Alcaide added, is that Calderon congratulate Mari Bras and Mari Bras congratulate Calderon for what each has said. He said the difference between what each "frustrated leader" Bras said is "merely geographic." Mari Bras had accused the

PDP of accepting CIA funds to organize the party's recent political rally in Ponce. The PIM leader charged that the CIA helped finance the PDP to help it regain power because polarization caused by the victory of a statehood party contributed greatly to the growth of the independence movement.

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PENTHOUSE
 SEPTEMBER 1971

Dossier on the

CIA

by William R. Carson

For some time I have been disturbed by the way the CIA has been diverted from its original assignment. It has become an operational and at times policy-making arm of the government. I never thought when I set up the CIA that it would be injected into peacetime cloak-and-dagger operations. — ex-President Harry S. Truman.

NOTHING has happened since that pronouncement by the agency's creator in December 1963 to remove or reduce the cause for concern over the CIA's development. As currently organized, supervised, structured and led, it may be that the CIA has outlived its usefulness. Conceivably, its very existence causes the President and the National Security Council to rely too much on clandestine operations. Possibly its reputation, regardless of the facts, is now so bad that as a foreign policy instrument the agency has become counter-productive. Unfortunately the issue of its efficiency, as measured by its performance in preventing past intelligence failures and consequent foreign policy fiascos, is always avoided on grounds of "secrecy". So American taxpayers provide upwards of \$750,000,000 a year for the CIA without knowing how the money is spent or to what extent the CIA fulfils or exceeds its authorized intelligence functions.

The gathering of intelligence is a necessary and legitimate activity in time of peace as well as in war. But it does raise a very real problem of the proper place and control of agents who are required, or authorized on their own recognizance, to commit acts of espionage. In a democracy it also poses the dilemma of secret activities and the values of a free society. Secrecy is obviously essential for espionage but it can be — and has been — perverted to hide intelligence activities even from those with the constitutional responsibility to sanction them. A common rationalization is the phrase "If the Ambassador/Secretary/President doesn't know he won't have to lie to cover up." The prolonged birth of the CIA was marked by a reluctance on the part of politicians and others to face these difficulties, and the agency as it came to exist still bears the marks of this indecision.

What we need to do is to examine how the U.S. gathers its intelligence, and consider how effective its instruments are and what room there is for improvement. Every government agency must be open to criticism. In 1964, the CIA's Director, acknowledged before the American Society

of Newspaper Editors that the CIA should be supervised by the Intelligence Agency. The time is long overdue for the CIA to assume its proper supervisory role in the Central Intelligence War. Under this CIA administration of inquiry by the CIA and specifically requiring disclosure of titles, salaries, and expenses of the CIA; (ii) expectations on expenses of the Director's staff without adverse effect on the Government and the Government's ability to attract staff abroad; their families; 1949 Central Intelligence Director a license

With so much is seen by many as a series of coups, in Guatemala, Mossadegh, the Cuban failure). The President Kennedy, 28, 1961, was heralded — y. Because the agency's "m...

representative of the unending gambit and bigger than life human aspect of espionage and secret operations. At this level the stakes are lower and the "struggle" frequently takes bizarre and even ludicrous twists. For, as Alexander Foote noted in his *Handbook for Spies*, the average agent's "real difficulties are concerned with the practice of his trade. The setting up of his transmitters, the obtaining of funds, and the arrangement of his rendezvous. The irritating administrative details occupy a disproportionate portion of his waking life."

As an example of the administrative hazards, one day in 1960 a technical administrative employee of the CIA stationed at its quasi-secret headquarters in Japan flew to Singapore to conduct a reliability test of a local recruit. On arrival he checked into one of Singapore's older hotels to receive the would-be spy and his CIA recruiter. Contact was made. The recruit was instructed in what a lie detector test does and was wired up, and the technician plugged the machine into the room's electrical outlet. Thereupon it blew out all the hotel's lights. The ensuing confusion and darkness did not cover a getaway by the trio. They were discovered, arrested, and jailed as American spies.

By itself the incident sounds like a sequence from an old Peters Sellers movie, however, its consequences were not nearly so funny. In performing this routine mission the CIA set off a two-stage international incident between England and the United States, caused the Secretary of State to write a letter of apology to a foreign chief of state, made the U.S. Ambassador to Singapore look like the proverbial cuckold, the final outcome being a situation wherein the United States Government lied in public — and was caught!

SAN JUAN, P.R.

STAR

MAY 3 1971

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
Mrs. Cordero Says Police, Not CIA, Burned Her House

Independence activist Ana Livia Cordero rejected Saturday allegations by a leftist terrorist group that the recent burning of her home was a CIA action.

In a prepared statement, Mrs. Cordero said the burning of her home in Barrio Tortugo of Rio Piedras was the result of a conflict between local authorities and barrio residents over the illegal construction of several speed breaks along the barrio road.

The statement says "police and relatives of the police" in Tortugo are responsible for the burning, which came in the wake of the March 11 riot in the University of Puerto Rico's Rio Piedras campus. Two policemen, one of them a Tortugo resident, died as a result of gunfire during the riot.

The Armed Commandes of Liberation (ACL) in a statement released to the press in which they claimed responsibility for the bombing of several stores in El Comandante shopping center, said they would avenge attacks against businesses and homes of independentistas in the wake of the UPR riot. They mentioned an attack against Mrs. Cordero's



ANA LIVIA CORDERO

home as one of the actions they would avenge.

Mrs. Cordero, however, said she rejects "the vengeance of ACL."

She said that "a sector in the police" used the killing of the policemen from Barrio Tortugo as an excuse to attack her home which they had planned for some time. Mrs. Cordero and a group of younger activist from Tortugo have been working in the community for several years.

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MAR 4 1971

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
Spying In Puerto Rico

By ED KONSTANT

STAR Washington Correspondent

WASHINGTON — It's almost getting so that you can't tell the spies in Puerto Rico without a storecard.

If the implications behind the snooping done there by the Army and the U.S. Justice Department weren't serious the entire affair could almost be dismissed as ludicrous. Just look at the cast of characters.



KONSTANT

Besides the Army, the Air Force and Navy have their own intelligence operations. Their scope may not have extended as far into the civilian field as that of the Army, but they are there, nevertheless.

Outside the military there are the other federal operations. The major effort, of course, is that of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. No one knows for sure what the Secret Service is doing. And, the Central Intelligence Agency's operations are supposed to be limited to listening to radio broadcasts from the Caribbean and Latin America at its secretive Cabo Rojo installation. But not even the CIA will admit that it confines itself there to that innocent pastime.

Besides these, the Commonwealth has its own surveillance activities. For one thing, there is police intelligence. For another, there's the Criminal Investigations Corps. The vice squad conducts undercover operations and so do the police narcotics division and the Treasury's office of special investigations. All of them have been involved in assorted tragi-comedy productions in recent years.

Frankly, there's nothing wrong with a little spying now and then. Any government is entitled to it to protect its own interests and that of the general public. At times it should be more than condoned — even insisted upon.

But it's irritating to know that effort is being duplicated and sometimes bungled, which is strictly a waste of taxpayer money. And, it's somewhat frightening to know that the Army has been poking its nose too deeply into areas that concern it only slightly.

The Army is entitled to information on potential revolutionaries. After all, civil control of disorders can fail. When it does, that's when the military traditionally is summoned.

But the military appears to have overstepped its bounds everywhere, compiling dossiers on law-abiding citizens in the States. Presumably, it had carte blanche from whoever dreamed up this surveillance scheme to do the same in Puerto Rico. The public may never know exactly what it did there but it certainly is entitled to know something more.

The Army surveillance revelations triggered recollections of a frightening incident that occurred in San Juan a couple of years ago.

both mutual friends — one a statehooder, the other an independentista.

The statehooder, it seems, was up for reclassification or something like that by the Puerto Rico Air National Guard. In filling in the dotted lines on a routine form he made the innocent mistake of listing his independentista friend as a reference.

It took the Air Force office of special investigations two days to straighten back into an innocent mistake something that in the meantime had become a priority security matter. The statehooder spent those two days under OSI surveillance that may have reached proportions of which he will never know.

"They kept asking me over and over: 'but why did you list his name?'" the statehooder recalled. He remembered the incident as an example of a low-budget Hollywood spy film. One of his comments was: "I kept looking around the room for the two-way mirror."

Whether the incident was overdone or necessary, it's left a fascination over how much data the OSI had on the independentista and how much information the military has gathered since on whoever in Puerto Rico they have kept their eyes upon.

That sort of spying is far more interesting and seems to be far more professional than the amateurish efforts of agents — Commonwealth and federal both — to take photographs and movies of wreath-laying ceremonies at the gravesites of Pedro Albizu Campos and Gilberto Concepcion de Gracia.

Most independentistas laugh at those juvenile film recording sessions. They seem to be a waste of time, effort and money, anyway — unless the camera spies are working on the side for the local flower society.

Apart from the military's activities, two other efforts appear to be even far more intimidating, primarily because unlike what the Army did, they are scheduled for the future.

One is that of the federal government's attempts to computerize all aspects of political dissent in Puerto Rico and elsewhere. The Justice Department's giant computer has already logged plenty of data and presumably will continue to do so.

The other is a proposal of the Commonwealth Crime Commission. It wants whoever is holding the reins in 1973 to look into the possibility of convincing the Commonwealth Legislature to enact a law permitting electronic surveillance. In other words, wiretapping.

Maybe all this means there will be even more spying in Puerto Rico's future. It certainly can't be knocked if it has a legitimate purpose or is effective. After all, spying must be an honorable profession. So many people are working at it.

It just doesn't seem to be working very well, at least not in Puerto Rico. Otherwise, the Armed Commandoes for Liberation would